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Since the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States,' it has
been a commonplace understanding that criminal juries have the power but not
the right to nullify the law before them,2 either choosing to acquit or convict
when they believe the law as presented by the judge to require otherwise. This
power stems from a combination of a long-recognized protection of jurors to
discharge their function with personal impunity,3  the double jeopardy
prohibition on retrial of acquitted defendants,' and the practical difficulties of
overturning erroneous guilty verdicts for insufficiency of evidence. 5 But, as
the Sparf Court noted, that power does not translate into a right, at least absent
some explicit authorization.6
1. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
2. See id. at 83 ("'[Ilt is [the jury's] duty to be governed by the instructions of the court as to all legal
questions .... They have the power to do otherwise, but the exercise of such power cannot be regarded
as rightful... ' (quoting Duffy v. People. 26 N.Y. 588. 593 (1863)) (emphasis added) Similarly. the tral
judge had instructed the jury that "even in this case you have the physical power to [return a verdict for
manslaughter] . . .; but... a jury is expected to be governed by la%. and the law a should rece e from
the court." Id. at 62 n.1 (initial emphasis added).
3. See Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate. 91 W VA
L. REv. 389, 393 (1989) (stating that Bushell s Case. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P 1670). -once and for all.
put to rest the practice of juror punishment for returning verdicts which judges felt were contrary to the
evidence"). Prior to Bushell's Case, jurors were subjected to severe sanctions for rendering verdtcts that
judges found to be contrary to the evidence. See id. at 403.
4. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see also Ashe v. Swenson. 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970) ("[Wlhatever
else that [the double jeopardy prohibitioni may embrace.., it surely protects a man who has been
acquitted from having to 'run the gauntlet' a second time.") (citations omitted).
5. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57. 67 (1984) ("Sufficiency-of-the.-cvidence review involves
assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
6. See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 102 ("[W]here the matter is not controlled by express constitutional or
statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as
declared by the court.").
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Since Sparf, judges and commentators who have weighed in on the issue
of jury nullification have typically asked whether nullification either makes for
good public policy or, even further, is mandated by one or more provisions of
the U.S. Constitution. Many have concluded that jury nullification undermines
the rule of law and thus ought to be discouraged.7 A growing literature,
however, argues that nullification actually serves ends that are important to a
variety of ideals to which we are socially or even constitutionally
committed-trial by jury, due process, even self-government.8
Parallel to this emerging scholarly defense of jury nullification, a
burgeoning grass-roots political movement seeks to inform jurors of their
power to nullify. The most prominent organization in this movement, the Fully
Informed Jury Association (FIJA), engages in tactics ranging from leafleting
jurors as they arrive at the courthouse to lobbying state legislatures to enact
legislation that would explicitly elevate the jury's formerly unspoken power to
nullify to an openly acknowledged right.9 Although none of the twenty-five
bills introduced by the group into state legislatures has become law,' 0
measures currently or recently under consideration in half a dozen states have
7. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1135-36 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969); Burke Marshall, Jurors Must Respect the Law, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1, 1986, at 36, 40; Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54
TEx. L. Rsv. 488, 512-25 (1976).
8. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 1-3, 247-48 (1994) (advocating democratic theory of
nullification); NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE 5, 336-37 (1995) (suggesting that nullification
may be understood to "perfect and complete the law," as well as to reflect accurately community
sentiment); JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 188-89 (1992) (endorsing explicit authorization of jury
nullification); David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court Should Instruct the Jury of
Its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIlM. L. REv. 89, 90 (1995) (arguing that jury nullification acts as part of
system of "checks and balances"); David N. Dorfman & Chris K. lijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness:
Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 900-01 (1995) (arguing that nullifying
jury acts as "popular check on executive and judicial discretion"); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury
Nullification: Thre Contours of a Controversy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 93
[hereinafter Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification] (advocating nullification instruction as instrumental
to "democratic self-rule"); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury
Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 182-83 (1991) [hereinafter Scheflin & Van Dyke, Merciful
Juries] (criticizing judges who refuse to give nullification instructions as "creating the anarchy they seek
to avoid"); Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 825, 842 (1990) (arguing that nullification should be "preserved and protected because it cannot be
removed without stripping the defendant of... [her] sixth amendment right[s]"); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1191-95 (1991) (arguing that jurors should be
understood to have authority to exercise "jury review," refusing to apply laws they deem unconstitutional);
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J.
677, 680 (1995) (calling for black jurors to acquit black defendants accused of nonviolent crimes, even
where jurors believe defendant legally guilty, in order to "dismantle the master's house with the master's
tools"); M. Kristine Creagan, Note, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative Developments, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1101, 1149-50 (1993) (withholding judgment on nullification's legitimacy, but suggesting
revisions to proposed nullification legislation in order to "encourage jurors to promote justice").
9. See Reynolds Holding, Group Tries to Sway Jurors, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 11, 1995, at BI; Todd R.
Wallack, Judges Hit "Vote Conscience" Jurors, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Sept. 17, 1994, at IA (describing
attempts by FIJA to influence jury pools at courthouse).




received considerable support." Even before the founding of FIJA, three state
constitutions-Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland-bore language that appeared
to recognize a jury's right to "judge" or "determine" the law.
At first glance, the enactment of the nullification power would appear to
circumvent much of the current attack on the legitimacy of nullification. The
Sparf court, after all, explicitly limited its holding to those instances where
juries were not explicitly authorized to ignore the law, apparently suggesting
that jurors could be so authorized. 2 The academic commentary has assumed
this point as well. Debate has centered on the public policy concerns that
militate for and against the jury's exercise of the nullification power, and
relatedly, for and against advising them of this power. No one to date has
questioned whether the jury might legitimately be given such a role by the
legislature or by the people in a state constitution. This oversight is easy to
understand, since there is little question that the enactment of the nullification
prerogative would confer on nullification many of the trappings of legitimacy.
That legislative mandate would also seem to mollify critics who had seen
nullification as disrupting the system of representative democracy. Nullification
as such would cease to exist 3 because, under the language of virtually every
proposal, jurors would be given the power to "judge" the law.
I argue in this Note, however, that the legitimacy problems inherent in jury
nullification run too deep to be cured by legislative enactment. As a matter of
democratic legitimacy, as well as constitutional law, the jury's power to nullify
becomes more, not less, problematic when it is elevated to the status of
putative right. Proponents of jury nullification have convincingly argued that
nullifying juries make law. Although they would conclude from this that the
jury might be understood as a lawmaking body parallel-or even superior--to
the legislature, I will argue that this insight demonstrates the crucial and fatal
flaw in the case for enactment of the jury nullification power. When
legislatures delegate to juries the right to make law, the law becomes not more
but less democratically legitimate. Furthermore, such delegations offend a
number of constitutional provisions.
In Part I, I discuss the current laws and proposed legislation enacting jury
nullification. While there are important differences among them, particularly
between the state constitution provisions now on the books and the current
plans, all the proposals grant significant lawmaking responsibilities to juries.
In Part II, I argue that such delegations of lawmaking responsibility cannot be
justified in terms of democratic theory. Democratic theory cannot countenance
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
13. Cf Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification ": iVhen Aay and Should a Jury Reject the
Law to Do Justice, 30 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 253 (1993) ("INluUification butlt into the system and
conceded to be reasonable and appropriate at times becomes a proper exercise of power within the law,
not a nullification of the law.").
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lawmaking by juries-either as they are currently composed, or as they might
conceivably be composed. In Part III, I show that the problems for democratic
theory also translate into constitutional infirmities in all the proposals under
discussion. Moreover, these plans offend other constitutional provisions that
do not necessarily rest on democratic norms. Given my claim that the
nullification power cannot legitimately be delegated to juries, I conclude in
Part IV by asking whether juries should continue to be insulated from personal
sanction for unauthorized exercise of that power.
I. AuTHORIZED JURY NULLIFICATION: HISTORY AND RECENT PROPOSALS
The last half decade has seen a flurry of state legislative activity aimed at
recognizing, as a matter of positive law, the jury's power to nullify. Such
legislation has been defeated in most of the twenty-five states where it has
been introduced, but legislation is still pending in a number of other states. 4
This legislation was approved by Oklahoma's house, Arizona's senate, and
legislative committees in at least three other states before ultimately failing.'
5
Legislators and the grass-roots supporters of these measures vow to reintroduce
the legislation each year until it passes. With each legislative session, growing
support seems to make passage more likely. Meanwhile, longstanding state
constitutional provisions in Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland contain language
appearing to give criminal juries the power to "determine" or "judge" the law
as well as the facts. In these states, however, judicial interpretation has
constrained much of the jury discretion seemingly intended by the provisions.
In this Part, I analyze the extent to which these state constitutional
provisions, as well as various proposals offered in recent years, can be
understood to grant lawmaking authority to juries. I argue that while the
language of the Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland constitutions lent itself to
judicial evisceration, the legislation more recently proposed has been styled so
as to be insulated from such judicial limitation. This insight is significant for
Parts II and III, which argue that authorizations of lawmaking authority
conflict with democratic norms and the U.S. Constitution. Thus, while judicial
limiting constructions in those three states have largely cured the democratic
and constitutional infirmities of their provisions, no such cures are available
for the nullification plans proposed more recently.
A. State Constitutions and the Power to Nullify
Discussions of jury nullification often include at least passing reference to
14. See Lambe, supra note 10. During the first two months of 1997, such legislation was proposed
in at least three states. See H.R. 5067, 1997 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997); H.R. 1494, 46th
Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1997); H.R. 519, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997).
15. See Lambe, supra note 10.
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provisions in the constitutions of Indiana and Maryland that are cast as
authorizing jury nullification. These states are then treated as "laboratories"'1
6
for studying how nullification works in practice. A similar provision in
Georgia is also sometimes cited for these purposes, 7 but some commentators
have recognized that interpretation by Georgia courts has rendered this
provision a nullity.'" What often goes unrecognized is that courts in Indiana
and Maryland have similarly cut back on the jury's nullification power within
their jurisdictions. Furthermore, while the language in these provisions might
plausibly be read to delegate a lawmaking power to the jury, it might
alternatively be read to say much less. This Section explores how the
provisions in these three states have functioned historically and how their
language has been constructed over time by the courts.
1. Georgia
Under a provision originally ratified in 1877, the Georgia Constitution
states that, "[i]n criminal cases .... the jury shall be the judges of the law and
the facts."' 9 Although the language authorizing jurors to act as "judges of the
law" might appear to give jurors broad discretion to reject either the law as
written by the legislature or as presented to them by the judge, any such
interpretation was foreclosed by judicial decisions following closely on the
heels of ratification.
Just three years after this constitutional provision was ratified, Hill v.
State' presented the Georgia Supreme Court with an opportunity to construe
and apply it. Hill was convicted of murdering one Simmons, whom Hill
accused of having seduced his wife. Although the trial court allowed the jury
to hear evidence of the alleged seduction, it instructed them that under state
law the killing could be excused only if it had been necessary to protect Mrs.
Hill from an immediate act of assault or seduction.2' The court instructed:
The court delivers to you the law with care and upon great
consideration, and you may safely rely upon its correctness as the
court delivers it. It is your exclusive province to find the facts in the
evidence. You judge the law and the facts, and they lead you to the
truth.
16. See, e.g., Dorfman & lijima, supra note 8, at 906-07. 907 n.243 and sources cted therein
17. See, e.g., In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 539 A.2d 664, 682 n.21 (Md. 1988); Scott. supra
note 3, at 390 n.6.
18. See, e.g., Creagan, supra note 8, at 1130 n.163.
19. GA. CONsT. art. 1, § 1, $ 11. The language ratified in 1877 is nearly idenucal ""T]he jury in all
criminal cases, shall be the judges of the law and the facts." Hams v State. 9 SE2d 183. 186 (Ga- 1940)
(quoting original constitutional language).
20. 64 Ga. 453 (1880).
21. See id. at 458.
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Take no heed of anything read or spoken to you to the contrary
hereof. Courts and juries cannot-nay, dare not-swerve from the
truth in the law any more than in the facts.
... The law is not wrong. But if it was wrong, neither you nor
the court could change it.2"
Although the trial court's charge did tell the jury that "[y]ou judge the law and
the facts," it clearly undercut that assertion by repeatedly cautioning the jurors
that they were to receive the law from the judge. Moreover, the court refused
to give the charge that "by virtue of the constitution of 1877, the jury in this
case are the judges of the law as well as of the facts."'
Despite the recent ratification of the 1877 Constitution, the Georgia
Supreme Court found this an easy case, writing just two paragraphs to uphold
the trial judge's charge against the defendant's claim that it had violated the
jurors' authority to be "judges" of the law.24 The court noted that the relevant
language in the constitution "simply re-enacts, in identical language"
preexisting language from the Georgia Penal Code.' Because courts had
construed that statutory language to preclude any authority on the part of jurors
"to be the judges of [the law] independently of the instructions of the court
thereon,"26 the supreme court reasoned that the same construction should be
given to the provision in the constitution. 27 "Had the convention ... intended
to change the construction of those words, it would have altered them.
2 1
Although the Hill court was correct in its assertion that the Georgia Penal
Code had been construed by 1877 to negate any real authority on the part of
juries to "judge the law" independently, 9 what it failed to convey was that
historically, the Code had also been given just the opposite reading. As the
court would later explain in Ridenhour v. State,3" "the uniform rulings of this
court, until after the war" held that "under the Penal Code of 1833, . . . the
jury could determine the law to be different from that given in charge by the
judge.",3' Although the court in Ridenhour noted this discrepancy, it refused
22. Id. at 456, 459-60.
23. Id. at 462.
24. See id. at 470-71.




29. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 40 Ga. 689, 696-97 (1870).
30. 75 Ga. 382 (1885).
31. Id. at 385. Neither Ridenhour nor any other Georgia opinion seems to have accounted for this
switch. The only clue is that the changed interpretation coincided with the end of the Civil War. Although
one might hypothesize changes in court composition or state policy accompanying Reconstruction that
might have led to changing attitudes towards nullification, the correlation may be nothing more than a
coincidence. Courts elsewhere in the United States abandoned similar instructions during the nineteenth
century. See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 176-77,
183 (1964) (discussing abandonment in Massachusetts ofsimilarjury instruction in mid-nineteenth century).
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to reconsider Hill, on the grounds that Hill was a unanimous ruling.3" In the
years since, the Georgia courts have declined to revisit the issue, consistently
reaffirming the Hill court's interpretation of this constitutional provision.33
Ultimately, Georgia offers only an example of authorized nullification that
might have been. By contrast, constitutional provisions in Maryland and
Indiana have historically received much broader construction; however, they
too have largely been construed away in recent decades. In the Subsections to
follow, I trace the application of these provisions in Maryland and Indiana in
order to show that the vague language used in these provisions lent itself to
varying interpretations, and thus to substantial judicial evisceration.
2. Maryland
Maryland's constitution provides that, "[i]n the trial of all criminal cases,
the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court
may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. '
Originally enacted in 1851," this provision was judicially construed for
decades as giving wide, though not unlimited, authority to juries. However, as
Maryland's high court noted in 1988, this provision has undergone a "process
of attenuation," so that "now ... the jury's right to judge the law is virtually
eliminated."36 Although the court declined to explain the reason for this
attenuation, the handwriting is on the wall: In a series of cases challenging the
constitutionality of this provision, the courts have gradually narrowed its scope,
leaving very little. Although the language in this constitutional provision is
ambiguous enough to be read, at one extreme, as giving jurors authority to
make law, or, at the other, as giving them virtually no additional rights at all,
the court has moved toward this second pole in an effort to save the provision
from constitutional invalidation.
From the outset, courts recognized functional limits on the jurors'
prerogative to "judge" the law. Because jurors only passed on the merits of the
case before them, they could only decide the "law of the crime, 37 or the
"definition of the crime" 3 and the "legal effect of the evidence before
32. See Ridenhour, 75 Ga. at 385-86.
33. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 9 S.E.2d 183, 186-87 (Ga. 1940) (reaffirming Hill and noting that it had
been consistently followed); Drummond v. State, 326 S.E.2d 787,788-89 (Ga, Ct. App 1985) (reaffirming
rule from Harris).
34. MD. CONST. (DEC. OF RIGHTS) art. XXIIi.
35. See Stevenson v. Stale, 423 A.2d 558, 561 (Md. 1980).
36. In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition. 539 A.2d 664. 682 (Md. 1988).
37. As Maryland's high court explained:
The jury are made the judges of law as well as of fact . . . under the Constitution of this State.
and any instruction given by the Court, as to the law of the crime, is but advisory, and in no
manner binding upon the jury, except in regard to questions as to what shall be considered as
evidence.
Wheeler v. State, 42 Md. 563, 570 (1875) (emphasis omitted).
38. Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275. 280 (1889).
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them."39 But the jury's discretion could not be unduly limited: "The [judge's]
instruction, when given, goes to the jury simply as a means of enlightenment,
and not as a binding and positive rule for their government ... ,4 In other
words, jurors were seen as having a lawmaking authority that extended only
to the law of the case they heard. Their verdicts were not to be regarded as
having any precedential weight. They might be said to make law, but only for
the defendants before them, not for the citizenry at large.
In addition to recognizing these functional limits on the jury's power,
Maryland judges gradually distinguished the jury's role from their own. Early
on, it was established that juries could not pass on the constitutionality of
statutes." It also became clear that judges had the power to decide what
evidence was admissible, and that such determinations could be made on the
basis of the facts needed to determine culpability in accord with the statutory
definitions of crimes.42 Curiously, the Maryland courts also spoke of the
jury's role in judicial terms, at times reading literally the jury's authority to
"judge the law"-not to evaluate its moral merits, but to determine whether the
law as enacted by the legislature was meant to cover the act committed. 3
Whatever the jury's role might have been in the early days of this
constitutional provision-apparently some combination of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial-the courts in Maryland have limited it in recent years.
Beginning in 1949, criminal defendants began to challenge this provision of
the Maryland Constitution, on the grounds that it violated their due process and
equal protection rights.44 Although the Maryland courts never found the
provision to be unconstitutional, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never heard
an appeal on the issue, the courts in Maryland gradually limited the very
discretion that was challenged by the appeals. Thus, by the time the Supreme
Court mentioned this provision in Brady v. Maryland,45 it could say that the
provision "does not mean precisely what it seems to say.
46
Curiously, this statement in Brady not only reacted to a process of judicial
attenuation of the jury's power to "judge the law," but has proven, in part, to
be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Although the Brady Court was referring only to
the effect of Maryland decisions limiting the jurors' authority to pass on
admissibility of evidence, this statement has cast a broad shadow over the
39. Id.
40. Id. Nor were judges required to give instructions at all; and, when given, they could be expressly
advisory. See id. at 279.
41. See Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236, 245-46 (1858).
42. See, e.g., Beard, 71 Md. at 280.
43. See, e.g., id. at 280-81.
44. See, e.g., Giles v. State, 183 A.2d 359, 364-67 (Md. 1962); Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456, 459-60
(Md. 1950); Slansky v. State, 63 A.2d 599, 601-05 (Md. 1949). The provision was also challenged In
federal courts. See, e.g., Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967); Wilkins v. State, 402 F. Supp.
76, 82 (D. Md. 1975).
45. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
46. Id. at 89.
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Maryland courts' interpretation of the provision. As Maryland courts have
further limited the jury's scope of discretion, they have consistently cited this
phrase from Brady.47 Both Brady's assurance that the constitutional provision
"does not mean precisely what it seems to say" and the judicial response to
this dictum seems to have had much to do with the insulation this provision
has received from constitutional scrutiny.'
The retreat over the past few decades was punctuated by the 1980 decision
in Stevenson v. State,49 in which Maryland's high court overruled the
longstanding doctrine in the state that because jurors were to "judge the law,"
the trial judge's instructions were merely advisory. 50 In so doing, the court
overturned not only its 1976 decision in Dillon v. State,51 but also precedent
dating back more than a century.5 2 Still, as much as the Maryland judiciary
has limited the extent to which jurors "judge the law," it has not entirely
eliminated that function, notwithstanding judicial statements to the contrary
quoted at the outset of this discussion.53 The one vestige remaining appears
in Maryland Rule 4-325, which, in criminal cases, allows counsel to argue a
point of law to the jury, dissenting from the legal position taken by the judge
in her instructions.54 However, such argument is only allowed where there is
a "sound basis"55 for the dispute-clearly a determination made by the courts.
As narrowly as the Maryland courts have construed the jury's province to
"judge the law," what they have left the juries, interestingly, is a highly limited
quasi-judicial function. Where there is a sound dispute as to a point of law,
arguments are made to the jury, which then may decide that issue as part of
its general verdict. The vagueness of Maryland's mandate that jurors "judge
the law" has left judges with wide discretion to define that role. They have
done so in a way that has foreclosed certain constitutional difficulties, but
which has left juries "judges of the law" in only the most limited sense.
3. Indiana
Like its Maryland counterpart, the Indiana constitutional provision
declaring that the criminal jury "shall have the right to determine the law and
47. See, e.g., Barnhard v. State, 602 A.2d 701, 706 (Md. 1992); In re Petiuon for Wnt of Prohibition.
539 A.2d 664, 682 (Md. 1988); Stevenson v. State, 423 A.2d 558. 563 (hid. 1980)
48. See, e.g., Wyley, 372 F.2d at 745 (upholding Maryland provision on ground that it does not confer
discretion that it might appear to do, citing phrase from Brad)
49. 423 A.2d 558.
50. See id. at 565-66.
51. 357 A.2d 360 (Md. 1976).
52. See Wheeler v. State, 42 Md. 563 (1875); see also Schanker v State. 116 A 2d 363 (Md 1955)
53. See supra text accompanying note 36.
54. See MD. R. 4-325; see also Barnhard v. State, 602 A.2d 701. 707 (Md 1992) (dtscussing Rule 4-
325).
55. Barnhard, 602 A.2d at 707.
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the facts, ' 56 has been subject to varying judicial interpretations over time.
Unlike the Maryland courts' approach, which replaces instructions that give
jurors an explicit mandate to find the law for themselves with instructions that
tell jurors that they must follow the judge's instructions as to the law, the
courts in Indiana have gravitated toward an approach that offers the jurors an
apparent contradiction: They are told both that they may determine the law and
that they are to follow the trial court's instructions.
As with Maryland, however, the Indiana courts began by interpreting the
jury's power broadly. In the 1857 case of Lynch v. State,57 just six years after
the provision in question was adopted, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that
the trial court "instructs juries in criminal cases, not to bind their consciences,
but to inform their judgments; and while great deference would naturally be
paid by the jury to the opinion of the judge. . . it cannot be said that they are
in duty bound to adopt it as their own."5" In the decades following Lynch,
many judicial decisions and jury oaths repeated the statement that the court's
instructions must not "bind the consciences" of the jurors.59 Although none
of the opinions spelled out what "conscience" had to do with the jurors'
function, this phrasing seemed to suggest that their role involved more than
merely applying the law as instructed by the judges, or indeed as it existed on
the statute books. Their consciences, so it seemed, had an independent role to
play in their judgment. The Indiana high court appeared to hold as much in
1878, ruling it error to tell the jurors that they were "governed by the
instructions,, 60 even when all the instructions given were true to the law.6'
On the inability of judges to issue binding jury instructions, however, the
court soon reversed course. In 1899, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a trial
court's refusal to tell the jury that "it is the duty of the court to instruct the
jury in the law, but [the judge's] instructions are ... advisory only, and you
may disregard them, and determine the law for yourselves. 62 The Indiana
Supreme Court explained that, although the trial court is obligated to inform
the jurors of their right to determine the law and the facts, "it is not required
to go any further. It is not required to neutralize the effect of its instructions
by telling the jury that they are at liberty to disregard them, and to decide the
law for themselves. 63 The only reason given by the court, however, seems
tautological: "The mere request for such an instruction savors of disrespect for
56. IND. CONST. art. I, § 19.
57. 9 Ind. 541 (1857).
58. Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., Cunacoff v. State, 138 N.E. 690, 691 (Ind. 1923); Schuster v. State, 99 N.E. 422, 424
(Ind. 1912).
60. McDonald v. State, 63 Ind. 544, 546 (1878).
61. See id. at 547.
62. Bridgewater v. State, 55 N.E. 737, 737 (Ind. 1899).
63. Id. at 739.
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the court; . . . it tends to degrade the court, and to bring it into contempt.'
Despite the court's scant explanation for its decision, the result has been
followed in Indiana ever since. No longer are jurors told that the instructions
are not to "bind their consciences."65 Indeed, they are often specifically told
that they are not to "make law." But jurors still must be informed of their
constitutional right to "determine the law," whatever that now means. As a
result, jury instructions in Indiana often seem contradictory. For example, an
Indiana appellate court recently approved the following instruction:
Since this is a criminal case the Constitution of the State of Indiana
makes you the judge of both the law and the facts. Though this means
that you are to determine the law for yourself, it does not mean that
you have the right to make, repeal, disregard, or ignore the law as it
exists. The instructions of the court are the best source as to the law
applicable to this case.67
Although instructions such as this are not logically contradictory, they do give
jurors potentially mixed messages. This instruction might be understood, for
example, to mean that jurors have an independent right to discover what the
law is-by reading statutes and judicial opinions, for example-and to apply
this to the case at bar, notwithstanding their general deference to the judge's
guidance. And Indiana courts have sometimes explained the instructions in this
way.68 But it seems equally plausible that jurors could find instructions such
as this to point in two opposite directions: toward independently determining
the law and toward merely following what the law tells them. On the basis of
such understandings some juries might be expected to follow the first prong
of their marching orders while others would follow the second.
From existing data, it is impossible to determine how juries in Indiana
perceive their role vis-a-vis the law and furthermore how they act on that
perception. One intriguing hint may be found in a study performed in Marion
64. Id.
65. See Beavers v. State, 141 N.E.2d 118, 122 (Ind. 1957) ("In our opimon junes should be bound
by their conscience .... ) (emphasis added). The Indiana Supreme Court has also upheld an instruction
telling jurors that "[als manly, upright men and woman ... you will put aside all sympathy and senument
and look steadfastly and alone to the law and the evidence in the case." Feggins v. State. 359 NE2d 517.
521 (Ind. 1977).
66. See, e.g., Beavers, 141 N.E.2d at 120, 122, 125 (upholding instruction that stated, inter alia. that
"jurors may [not] ... make and judge the law as they think it should be in any particular case"); Jennings
v. State, 503 N.E.2d 906, 912 (Ind. CL App. 1987) (upholding instruction that jurors did not "have the nght
to make, repeal, disregard or ignore the law as it exists").
67. State v. Willis, 552 N.E.2d 512. 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); see also McClanahan v State, 118
N.E.2d 734,734-35 (Ind. 1954) (refusing to overtum guilty verdict after jury foreman obtained statute book
from bailiff and read from it to jury). But see Fuquay v. State. 583 N.E.2d 154. 156 (Ind Ct_ App- 1991)
(upholding denial of proposed instruction telling jurors: "You have the nght to independently determine
the law to be different from the instruction from the Court.").
68. See, e.g., Beavers, 141 N.E.2d at 125 (stating that jury and judge have "coordinate nghtlsr*').
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County, Indiana, by Martha Myers from 1974 to 1976.69 Myers sought to
analyze and quantify variables affecting the legal culpability of individual
defendants, as well as other factors that were "legally irrelevant," but which
she suspected might play into jury verdicts.70 Her conclusion was that "rule
departures occurred only under fairly specialized circumstances." 7! For
instance, juries appeared to take into account such factors as the victim's age
and the defendant's employment status-factors that had no relevance under
statutory law in Indiana-a phenomenon Myers called "making law.
' 72
But Myers's work is only suggestive as to the causal effects of the
contradictory instructions given in Indiana because her study made no attempt
to compare jury behavior in Indiana with jury behavior elsewhere. The
tendency to consider such factors as the victim's age or defendant's
employment status may be a function of jury behavior in general, or it may
result from the partial mandate given to Indiana jurors to "determine the law."
To the extent that Myers's work suggests only infrequent nullification, in
absolute terms, it seems safe to say that the judicial limitations on the power
of Indiana juries to "determine the law" have had some success.
B. Current Reform Proposals
In contrast to the vague grants of jury power in Georgia, Maryland, and
Indiana, recent state legislation aimed at enacting the nullification right has
tended to be more precise and thus presumably more insulated from judicial
limitation. Since the founding of FIJA in 1989, bills aimed at informing jurors
of their power to nullify the law have been introduced in at least twenty-five
states.73 None of these bills has yet become law, but momentum may be
building. Not only has FIJA won greater media attention and legislative
influence each time it has introduced legislation in a given state, but it has
modified its plank to become more palatable to legislators and citizens at large.
Typical of FIJA's early legislative efforts was the 1991 bill introduced in
the Louisiana state legislature. The bill would have amended the Code of
Criminal Procedure to include the following provision:
The court shall charge the jury:
(1) as to the law applicable to the case;
(2) [t]hat the jury is the judge of the law and of the facts on the
question of guilt or innocence, that it may accept and apply the law
69. See Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 L. &
Soc'y REv. 781 (1979).
70. See id. at 788-90.
71. Id. at 795.
72. Id.
73. See Lambe, supra note 10.
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as given by the court or it may judge the merits and application of the
law; and
(3) [t]hat the jury alone shall determine the weight and credibility of
the evidence.74
Elements of this bill were repeated throughout FIJA legislation proposed in the
same time period: identification of a "right" to nullify and a requirement that
judges inform jurors of the right.
The impetus for something of a sea change in FIJA's proposals came from
what may be thought an unlikely source: a student-written Note. 7 5 Writing in
the Case Western Reserve Law Review, M. Kristine Creagan provisionally
embraced the goals of FIJA but argued that by changing the language of its
proposal, it could mollify critics and make passage more likely.7 ' FIJA
reacted almost immediately to incorporate Creagan's ideas. As a FIJA bulletin
explained: "After five years, you'd think we'd have settled by now on the
'optimal' language for FIJA legislation. Frankly, we thought we had it down
pretty pat, but then we read an academic article about our own
efforts-constructive criticism-and put our thinking caps back on.""7
The second-generation FIJA proposal, much of which is taken directly
from Creagan's proposed bill,7" reads as follows:
An accused or aggrieved party's right to trial by jury, in all
instances where the government or any of its agencies is an opposing
party, includes the right to inform the jurors of their power to judge
the law as well as the evidence, and to vote on the verdict according
to their conscience.
This right shall not be infringed by any statute, juror oath, court
order, or procedure or practice of the court, including the use of any
method of jury selection which could preclude or limit the
empanelment of jurors willing to exercise this power.
Nor shall this right be infringed by preventing any party to the
trial, once the jurors have been informed of their powers, from
presenting arguments to the jury which may pertain to issues of law
and conscience, including (1) the merit, intent, constitutionality or
applicability of the law in the instant case; (2) the motives, moral
perspective, or circumstances of the accused or aggrieved party; (3)
74. H.R. 1682, 17th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1991). repnnted in Creagan, supra note 8. at 1119 n 114
Similar, but by no means identical, bills before statc legislatures in Anzona. Massachusetts. New York. and
Tennessee during 1991 are also reprinted in Creagan, supra note 8. at 1116-20 nn 102, 105. 109 & I I.
75. See Creagan, supra note 8.
76. See id. at 1150.
77. What, New FIJA Bill Language? (visited Feb. 5. 1997) <http:I/nowscape com/fija/_fija94.htm>
[hereinafter New FIJA Bill Language].
78. See Creagan, supra note 8, at 1144-45. One significant part of Creagan's proposal that FUA chose
not to incorporate would have limited attorneys' nullification arguments by explicit rcfcrcnce to the ethical
responsibility not to advance a claim that is unwarranted under existing law See id
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the degree and direction of guilt or actual harm done; or (4) the
sanctions which may be applied to the losing party.
Failure to allow the accused or aggrieved party or counsel for that
party to so inform the jury shall be grounds for mistrial and another
trial by jury.79
This language has recently been introduced with slight modifications in the
state legislatures of California, Connecticut, and Iowa, and, with greater
modifications, in Texas and Utah.80
A third type of jury nullification provision has been proposed in New
York. That legislation would, at the defendant's option, require the judge to
instruct the jury that it
has the final authority to decide whether or not to apply the law to the
facts before it, that it is appropriate to bring into its deliberations the
feelings of the community and its own feelings based on conscience,
and that nothing would bar the jury from acquitting the defendant if
it feels that the law, as applied to the facts, would produce an
inequitable or unjust result.8'
FIJA has also recently suggested that its second-generation proposal be
modified to require explicitly an instruction, if requested by the defendant,
informing the jurors that they may only nullify unidirectionally. Under this
modification, jurors would be told: "In no case may you escalate the charges
against a criminal defendant."82 Yet only the defeated New York bill quoted
above seems to have followed FIJA's lead. Bills proposed in the first two
months of 1997 followed one or the other of the earlier formats.83
Unlike the vague nullification provisions adopted in Georgia, Maryland,
and Indiana, which have lent themselves to judicial evisceration, all of the
recent proposals-in each of their three generations-state explicitly how,
when, and to what extent the jury is to be informed of this right. The first-
generation FIJA proposal, which might appropriately be dubbed a "blanket
nullification" plan, would require judges to inform juries that they have a right
to nullify. Although FIJA has abandoned the blanket nullification proposal, this
proposal still has its proponents; legislation introduced last year in Oklahoma
79. New FIJA Bill Language, supra note 77.
80. See S. 2140, 1995-96 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996); H.R. 5067, 1997 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
(Conn. 1997); H.R. 130, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1995); S. 287, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1995);
H.R. 519, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R. 182, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah 1996).
81. S. 4157, 218th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995).
82. Proposed 1996 Fully Informed Jury Bill Language (visited Feb. 6, 1997) <http:llwww.
primenet.com/-slack/fija/bill-96.txt>.
83. See H.R. 1494, 46th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1997) (tracking first-generation FIJA proposal);
H.R. 5067, 1997 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1997) (tracking second-generation FIJA proposal); H.R.
519, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997) (same).
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took this form.84 FIJA's second-generation proposal and its legislative
manifestations, which I will collectively term "defendant-optional nullification"
plans, incorporate three important modifications from blanket nullification
proposals. First, the jury would be informed that it had not a "right," but rather
a "power" to nullify.85 Second, the jury would only be so informed at the
defendant's option. Finally, counsel, rather than the judge, would inform the
jury of this authority; and in order to make meaningful counsel's option to so
inform the jury, defendant-optional nullification legislation would prevent the
judge from interfering with counsel's nullification arguments. The third-
generation, "unidirectional nullification" proposals would break with blanket
and defendant-optional nullification plans by authorizing juries to nullify only
in the direction of acquittal or other lenience.
Although all these proposals share the goal of explicitly informing jurors
of their authority to nullify the law, they do so in ways that prove significantly
different, both cosmetically and mechanically. What they all do quite well,
however, is insulate the authorized nullification schemes from the kind of
judicial limitation that long ago eviscerated putative nullification provisions in
Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland. But precisely because the grants of authority
embodied in these various proposals seem likely to resist judicial narrowing,
they bring into sharp focus the potential democratic and constitutional
difficulties for openly authorized nullification.
II. THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF JURY LAWMAKING
Proponents of jury nullification generally take one of two approaches to
ground the legitimacy of the practice within a democratic framework. First, and
most basically, some argue that nullification can operate as a vehicle for direct
democracy. Unlike elected representatives, who may be out of touch with the
electorate and may fall sway to manipulative special interest politics, the jurors
are the people. A second and more subtle argument describes the jury as
having powers coordinate to the institutional branches of government; the jury
nullification power may thus be seen as a veto akin to that held by the other
branches in the criminal law context. This argument harnesses the notion of
juries nullifying to do justice (an argument that otherwise stands quite outside
this Note's focus) and puts it to work towards a slightly different task: When
the jury exercises its prerogative to grant the defendant mercy, it checks the
authority of other institutional actors.
84. See H.R. 1494, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Oa 1997): see also H.R. 1031,45th Leg.. Ist Reg.
Sess. (Okla. 1995) (proposing similar language).
85. It is not clear, however, that the "right" versus "power'" distinction really makes a difference in
terms of the effect on jury behavior. FUA claims that it is a distinction without a difference, except that
the use of the term "power" will assuage critics. See New FIJA Bill Language, supra note 77
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Curiously, neither of these arguments attempts to ground legitimacy in the
fact of enactment of the jury power. In part, this may derive from the
nullificationists' suspicion of politics; if the purpose of the jury's nullification
power is either to supplant or check the lawmaking power of the legislature
and executive, it would seem self-contradictory to ground legitimacy in an
action by those bodies that would enact such a power. From this perspective,
the FIJA efforts to pass legislation enacting that power may seem to reflect
mere expediency. However, there may be a deeper explanation for the territory
on which the nullificationists defend the prerogative: In order for a delegation
of power to be democratically legitimate, it must not only be agreed upon by
a democratic body, but it must also remain consistent with democratic
principles. An autocrat invested with power by the last act of a democratic
assembly can claim that her power is democratically legitimate in only the
thinnest sense.
In this Part, I argue that once we probe beneath the act of legislative
authorization, the positively recognized power of juries to nullify the law fails
to give rise to democratic lawmaking under either of the two claims offered
by its proponents. The argument from jury democracy falters because juries
can neither represent nor embody the community or its will. Not only do juries
fail to reflect an adequate demographic sample of the community, but their
voting rules make them minoritarian rather than majoritarian bodies. It is
impossible to reform their minoritarian nature without undermining what little
confidence we do have in their verdicts' representativeness. The argument from
jury mercy fails because it misunderstands the polarity of jury nullification
(focusing on nullification acquittals, while turning a blind eye towards
nullification convictions), because it reductively misconstrues the purpose of
the criminal law, and because it fails to cast the nullifying jury as a satisfying
check. At the end of this Part, I return to the implications of these two failed
arguments not only for the power delegated but for the act of delegation itself.
A. Authorized Nullification as a Democratic Reform
Many of the exponents of jury nullification extol the democratic virtues of
the institution. Some refer to the jury as an "expression of the sovereignty of
the people," 6 others as a "lawmaking" body. 7 James Levine sees the jury
as having a "legislative role," which he believes would become "more explicit
and more honorable" if judges would instruct jurors that they had a right to
nullify."8 Jeffrey Abramson argues that "the jury version of democracy stands
almost alone today in entrusting the people at large with the power of
86. Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing
Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1249 (1995).
87. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification, supra note 8, at 68.
88. See LEvN, supra note 8, at 189.
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government." 9 The common theme of all these claims is that the jury can
better represent the interests, desires, and preferences of the people than can
government officials. This approach assumes not that government officials are
evil or usurpatious, but merely that they are separate from the people in a way
that the jury is not. Legislatures and executives, who together hold the
institutional power to make law, are only representatives of the people. But
juries are made up of the people and thus have both a more fundamental
authority to make law and a better ability to effectuate democratic will.
While the supporters of nullification are undoubtedly right that nullification
is a form of lawmaking-whereby jurors fashion the law as it will apply to the
defendant before themg°-I take issue with their claim that such lawmaking
can be consistent with the democratic ideals that they espouse and that are
built into our system of government. Nullification simply cannot function as
democratic decisionmaking, even when the institution is designed by
conscientious architects who consider that goal paramount. The jury, even
when substantially reformed and reconceptualized, cannot at once represent its
community and function in a majoritarian manner.
Jury lawmaking conceptualized as direct democracy falters in several
respects. First, juries as they are now composed fail to reflect a representative
cross section of the American populace." Although the Supreme Court has
taken steps to eliminate practices that had the effect of excluding racial and
gender groups from the pool of potential jurors, 2 as well as steps against
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,93 disparities still exist in jury
89. ABRAMSON, supra note 8, at 2.
90. Authorized jury nullification exhibits at least three important deviations from normal legislative
procedure. First, juries deliberate in secret. Second, the rules of conduct they fashion are not forward.
looking. Neither of these stands to make their conduct functionally less -legislative", both, however. may
have other troubling consequences. The black box of jury deliberation is harder to police for illegal
motivation than is open legislative discussion. The nullifying jury's backward-looking temporal orentation
may give rise to ex post facto concerns just as for a legislature. A thud difference-that a jury only
fashions the legal rules in a given case (rather than making rules of general applcabltty)-may be
important when evaluating unauthwrized nullification. But when legislatures validate the nullification
prerogative, they give to juries in the aggregate the power to fashion rules of conduct, which though
variable from jury to jury, will be binding on defendants as a class.
91. Failure to represent the community poses a problem for the proponents of jury democracy. because
they necessarily appeal to an ideal of direct democracy. Of course. parallel objections might be raised
against legislative bodies, either because their membership does not reflect the makeup of the community
or because certain groups in the citizenry disproportionately failed to cast votes But it is hard to know what
to make of this argument, for unlike direct democracy, representative democracy allows no simple
evaluation of the correlation between characteristics of ciuzens and lawmakers
92. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (interpreting Sixth Amendment to include
"fair-cross-section" requirement, which is violated, inter alia. when "the jury pool is made up of only
special segments of the populace").
93. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that prosecutor's use of race-bascd
peremptory challenges violates Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); see also Georgia v
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending Batson analysis to use of race-based peremptory challenges by
criminal defendant); cf. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (invalidaung gender-based
peremptory challenges by civil litigant); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.. 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(invalidating race-based peremptory challenges by civil litigant).
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representation.94 Moreover, without explicitly discriminating against protected
classes, attorneys continue to use sophisticated techniques to select jurors based
on desirable demographic, political, or social characteristics.95 Even the
burden of jury service, in terms of time and money, is likely to influence
which people will either attempt to be excused or fail to show up for voir dire
at all. From the perspective of a democratic theory of the jury, the jury's
ability to reflect the community's sentiment, rather than its demographic
makeup, is most central; of course, at times, the two may overlap.96
The problems mentioned thus far point to the failure of the current jury
selection system to yield a representative cross section of the population. Some
commentators have put forth plans to make juries more representative of the
population as a whole by eliminating peremptory challenges, by making jury
service mandatory, or both.97 Even if the members of a jury could be selected
at random, the sample size would be too small to instill much confidence in
the statistical representativeness of that jury. Of course, if all adult residents
were eligible to serve on juries, and a lottery randomly assigned them to
mandatory service, we could expect juries on average to be representative of
the community. But any given jury would still only contain a small sample of
the community that might or might not contain an even statistical distribution.
Recent work has suggested increasing the size of juries in order to ensure
greater representation,9" but even doubling or tripling the size of the jury
would not make it a much better statistical representation of the community.
Despite inadequacies in the ability of such a small sample to reflect an
even distribution of a community, another aspect of the criminal jury may well
alleviate our concerns about sample size: The unanimity requirement99
ensures that even a single juror can have veto power over the rest of the body.
That is, even if we are not convinced that a particular jury reflects the beliefs
94. See, e.g., Hiroshi Fukurai, Race, Social Class, and Jury Participation: New Dimensions for
Evaluating Discrimination in Jury Service and Jury Selection, 24 J. CRIM. JUST. 71 (1996) (finding that
in Orange County, California, both minorities and poor are underrepresented on juries).
95. See, e.g., The Jury Is Still Out on the Motivations for Using Trial Consultants, CORP. LEGAL
TimEs, Jan. 1996, at I ("'We can no longer have all women or all men on our juries, or certain races or
ethnic backgrounds. That's where a trial consultant can help. We base our selections on individual
characteristics and not on a wide range of stereotypes.'") (quoting jury selection expert).
96. In some instances, jury demographics may be expected to inform a jury's decisionmaking, and this
is doubtless the calculus used by litigants who would seek to strike certain jurors based on such identifiable
demographic characteristics.
97. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1169, 1178-83 (1995).
98. See Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in Jury Reform, 34
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 136 (1997). Under Lichtman's intricate proposal, cases would be heard and
deliberated by 24 jurors, of whom only 12, selected at random, would actually cast votes. See id.
99. Although the Supreme Court has held that the traditional requirement of jury unanimity is not
constitutionally mandated, see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), all but two states, Oregon and
Louisiana, require criminal jury verdicts (for offenses more serious than simple misdemeanors) to be
unanimous, see Lichtman, supra note 98, at 138 n.24. In jurisdictions requiring unanimity, failure by the
jury to reach unanimity results in a "hung jury"; such cases may then be retried without violating the
double jeopardy prohibition. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984).
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of the community from which it is drawn, a unanimous verdict gains
credibility from the fact that all its members had to agree. Assume, for
instance, that a jury included ten Flat-Earthers and two Round-Earthers, '
despite precisely the opposite distribution of these groups in the community at
large. No Round-Earther would have cause to complain later that the jury
failed to represent the full distribution of this group in society, since any
conclusive verdict (guilty or not guilty) would require the participation of the
two Round-Earthers. Thus, the unanimity requirement has the important effect
of ensuring that, even if the jury fails to mirror the dominant sentiment of the
community proportionately, some members of the dominant opinion group are
likely to be present on the jury and may prevent the jury from neglecting this
dominant sentiment. Although this account does neglect important effects that
a "critical mass" of dissenters may have on deliberative behavior,"0 ' what is
important to see here is the role that the unanimity requirement plays in getting
us past an objection based on sample size.
As important as the unanimity requirement is to legitimating jury
lawmaking, it also serves to expose one of the deepest democratic deficiencies
in such lawmaking: The unanimity requirement makes the criminal jury not a
majoritarian body, but a minoritarian one. Because a single member of the jury
retains veto power over the rest of the body, the dissenter holds much greater
power than that held by the dissenter in a legislative assembly that utilizes
simple majority voting rules. The single dissenting juror may hold out, and
frustrate eleven other jurors who would choose either acquittal or
conviction.102 Although such behavior would typically result in retrial of the
defendant, repeated trials with repeated dissenters could frustrate judgment
indefinitely. Perhaps more problematic still, the single dissenter might instead
use her single vote as leverage against the others in deliberation, achieving a
compromise that would overstate her influence (that is, move the result not
merely incrementally in the direction of her position; the other eleven jurors
might meet her half way).1
3
100. For purposes of this illustration, I presume Flat-Earthers and Round-Earthers to be members of
opinion groups, rather than demographic groups. In the real world, of course. people do not come neatly
prepackaged in such opinion groups. Otherwise, a law could be passed requiring each jury to be made of
exactly the right proportion of each opinion group in the community. It may be profitable, then. to think
of these groups as made up of people who share an opinion as to the particular issue relevant to the case
at hand. In other words, while Round-Earthers may disagree among themselves as to a variety of issues,
they happen to all agree about the roundness of the Earth-an issue that for purposes of this hypothetical
is presumed to bear on the case before this jury.
101. See, e.g., Robert T. Roper, Jury Size and Verdict Consistency. 14 L. & Soc'Y R"v. 977. 988-89
(1980) (concluding that critical mass of two or more jurors is generally necessary before initially dissenting
jurors can withstand pressure to conform).
102. Cf Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry 1oman: Why Are Hung Juries on the Rse?. NEw YORKER. Feb.
24/Mar. 3, 1997, at 54 (presenting juror interviews documenting holdout behavior in District of Columbia)-
103. Even under majority voting, a small faction might be able to overstate its influence. Thus. in
legislative assemblies a "center" group may hold out and force compromise by one of two larger groups
with more polarized views. The jury's unanimity rule has a more dramatic effect because even a single
dissenting juror may hold out against eleven fellow jurors. In bodies operating by majonty rule. by contrast.
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Thus, an intractable paradox develops in the argument for democratic
legitimacy of lawmaking by the criminal jury. We might think it necessary to
relax the unanimity requirement in order to make voting closer to majoritarian.
However, such a move would undermine the sole basis we have for confidence
in a necessarily small sample size. The jury as lawmaking body cannot serve
at the same time to represent the community and to function in a majoritarian
fashion. Whatever the current democratic deficiencies of legislatures,
authorized jury nullification seems an unsatisfying remedy, for while it does
bring wider citizen participation in government, it allows the personal biases
and predilections of individual citizens, rather than the sentiment of the
community at large, to shape the law for each criminal trial.
Before moving on to the next argument that nullificationists use to support
jury lawmaking, it is worth briefly considering whether the jury's
minoritarianism might not in fact be a good thing. After all, do we not seek
to protect minorities in our system? Might not empowering minorities in
lawmaking serve just the sorts of interests that the Supreme Court articulated
in the well-known Carolene Products footnote1' 4 and that John Hart Ely
advanced in his theory of representation reinforcement? 5 The answer, quite
simply, is that the minorities that the unanimity requirement empowers need
not correspond to the "discrete and insular"'" ones that such theories have
sought to protect. Although at times the sole dissenter on a jury panel might
be a member of a socially disadvantaged group, there is no reason to expect
this to be the rule. A dissenter might well be a member of the Ku Klux Klan
in ajury otherwise made up of antiracists. Indeed, even putting aside the issues
of minoritarian voting behavior, a jury might overrun (either by a single
dissenter or by a unanimous vote) the very protections we have put into our
system to guard against discrimination. A single dissenter might stymie the
effort to penalize egregiously discriminatory behavior under the criminal law.
Alternatively, a unanimous jury might decide-within its black box-to
presume a defendant guilty because of her race, creed, or political affiliation.
B. Jury Mercy as Structural Check
Independent of the claim of democratic legitimacy, some supporters ofjury
a small minority only gains inordinate power when other members are fractured into sub-majority blocs.
Undoubtedly, rule according to universal consensus would have a stronger claim to democratic
legitimacy than would rule by a bare majority. See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-
Government: Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 401
(1997). The unanimity rule might be lauded for giving jurors an incentive to deliberate and an opportunity
to forge consensus. Although the rule may have a legitimate role in shaping such consensus, it cannot act
as a democratically legitimate decision rule. Unanimity is preferable to majority rule, but majority rule is
preferable to minority rule.
104. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4. (1938).
105. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DisTRusT 135-79 (1980).
106. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
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nullification argue that it can serve as an institutional check on the professional
branches of government. The jury, they maintain, can exercise a "veto," for no
defendant may be convicted without the concurrence of the legislature (writing
the law), the executive (typically signing the law), the prosecutor (deciding to
prosecute), the judge (allowing prosecution to proceed), and the jury (declining
to exercise its nullification power). 7 Central to the theory of the "jury veto"
is an understanding of nullification as having the potential only to aid the
criminal defendant. Although this claim is often made in the abstract, it is also
made by those who would seek an open, legislatively enacted form of jury
nullification. In order to protect individual liberties, this argument runs, the
entire criminal justice system is stacked in favor of the defendant; if the jury,
or any other coordinate actor in the process, refuses to convict the defendant,
she will be set free. According to one proponent of this view, the jury's
exercise of its "power to acquit, notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of
guilt ... is simply an act of mercy to a particular defendant in a specific
case.'' ° This definition of nullification as "jury mercy" is not uncommon in
the literature.1°9 However, the concept is gravely mistaken on three levels.
First, on an empirical level, nullifying juries can exercise vengeance as well
as mercy; in nearly all recent proposals for nullification, little restraint would
be placed on the jury's ability to penalize defendants."' Second, on a
theoretical level, our criminal justice system serves important ends that would
be neglected were guilty defendants to be freed by jury "veto." Explicit
authorization, rather than mitigating these problems, serves to embed them in
the legal system. Finally, even though we ought to be concerned about the
discretion other actors can exercise, additional jury discretion is a dangerous
and unsatisfying remedy.
When jurors step inside the jury room and begin to deliberate the fate of
the defendant before them, there is no one to watch over their shoulders. With
rare exception, cameras and other recording devices do not follow them. Thus,
regardless of the instructions given, jurors are essentially on their honor to
follow them. Especially where the jury chooses to acquit in the teeth of the
law and evidence, the judge is powerless to overturn its verdict, as jeopardy
has attached. But a jury may also nullify by choosing to convict despite
believing a defendant to be legally innocent.
To understand how this is possible, imagine a crime with two elements.
The judge instructs the jurors that they must find both elements in order to
pronounce the defendant guilty. Although there was sufficient evidence-albeit
107. See Dorfman & lijima, supra note 8, at 901 (-As a popular check on executive and judicial
discretion, the nullification instruction would inject more democracy into the jusice system ")
108. Brody, supra note 8, at 90-91.
109. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 8, at 700 ("Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant
who it believes is guilty of the crime with which he is charged."); Creagan. supra note 8. at 1114
110. See supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
19971 2583
The Yale Law Journal
conflicting-of both elements for the judge to send the jury into deliberations,
the jurors decide among themselves that only Element One was proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Legally, at least under a regime where juries are not
affirmatively given a power to nullify, they are duty-bound to return to the
courtroom and render a verdict of "not guilty." But they also have the ability
at this point to fashion their own law and achieve a different result. Perhaps
they believe that Element One, standing alone, should be sufficient to convict
a defendant. Or perhaps they feel passionately about the defendant's moral
worthlessness, about the victim's saintliness, or about either's racial group.
Ultimately, the point is that lawless juries have the power to nullify not only
to the defendant's advantage, but to the defendant's disadvantage as well."'
Although jurors have the power to issue nullification convictions even in
a regime where they are not openly granted such a right, studies show that
when juries are given instructions informing them of their nullification power,
they do indeed use this power both to aid certain defendants and to penalize
others. Irwin Horowitz has conducted research in which he gave mock jury
panels one of two sets of instructions: one telling them that they must follow
the law, or another explicitly granting them a right to nullify according to their
consciences." 2 Horowitz found that although most jury panels behaved
"responsibly" (that is, they chose not to nullify) regardless of the instruction,
the nullification instruction had a slight but detectable effect: Although jurors
given the nullification instruction generally exhibited more mercy toward the
defendant, where defendants were particularly unsympathetic, jurors receiving
the nullification instruction rendered systematically harsher verdicts."
3
Horowitz's laboratory experiments are confirmed by the real world
research performed by Martha Myers in Marion County, Indiana." 4 Myers
found that the jurors in her study, all of whom served in a state where a
limited nullification instruction is the norm," 5 appeared to consider such
legally irrelevant factors as the defendant's employment status and the victim's
age."' Not surprisingly, in states where constitutional provisions arguably
provide some basis for a nullification instruction, some defendants assert a
right to such an instruction, while others fight hard against it. For instance, in
111. My argument here is not that there is perfect symmetry between the jury's ability to render
nullification convictions and nullification acquittals. After all, as we saw in the previous Section,
deadlocked juries result in at least a temporary victory for the defendant. This result derives not from the
construction of the jury, but from the criminal law's baseline of "innocent until proven guilty." My
argument in this Section is merely that nullification convictions are indeed realistically possible and in fact
have been observed in experiments where jurors are informed of a nullification right. See infra notes
112-16.
112. See Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, Arguments, and
Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 439, 444 (1988).
113. Seeid. at 439.
114. For a discussion of Myers's research, see supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
115. For a discussion of Indiana's jury instructions, see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text,
116. See Myers, supra note 69, at 795.
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the Georgia case of Hill v. State,' 7 a defendant charged with killing a man
who had allegedly seduced his wife sought a nullification instruction.
Apparently Mr. Hill had reason to expect jurors under the circumstances to
sympathize with his motives, and perhaps even to excuse his behavior. By
contrast, defendants such as Jim Slansky, on trial for bigamy, have reason to
fear and to challenge nullification instructions.""
Some commentators apparently believe, however, that the trial judge's
power to acquit a defendant and the appellate court's power to review a
conviction for the sufficiency of the evidence ensure that legally innocent
defendants will not be convicted by lawless juries. David Brody, for example,
claims that the argument that nullifying juries may convict "innocent
people ... based on factors outside the scope of the trial ... has little
substantive merit."".9 Brody points to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which requires that the judge enter a judgment of acquittal
when the "evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction."' -, Although he
cites one federal appellate court's interpretation of this Rule, he fails to
recognize the significance of the interpretation. The Seventh Circuit, as Brody
notes, 12' has held that under Rule 29, "[a] district court should grant a
motion for acquittal when the relevant evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the government, is insufficient for a rational juror to find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."'' 22 What Brody and so many of his fellow
nullification proponents fail to see is that the standard for acquittal by the
judge (in a jury trial) is significantly higher than the standard for acquittal by
the jury. Under the Seventh Circuit's formulation, the judge must first resolve
all evidentiary ambiguities in the government's favor and then determine that
only an irrational juror could find the defendant guilty. Given the disparity
between the standards for bench and jury acquittals, it is clearly possible for
cases to be sent to the jury, and for the jury, though believing the defendant
legally not guilty, still to convict. Such a problem would only be exacerbated
by a system in which jurors were openly informed of a nullification right, for
once evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury, the jury could make
its decision based on any criteria it chose.
Of course, the dangers of nullification convictions seem to be muted where
the jury is explicitly authorized only to nullify in the defendant's favor, as in
117. 64 Ga. 453 (1880). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text
118. See Slansky v. State, 63 A.2d 599 (Md. 1949).
119. Brody, supra note 8. at 117 (citation omiued).
120. FED. R. CRnI. P. 29.
121. See Brody, supra note 8, at 117 n.200.
122. United States v. Klein, 910 F.2d 1533, 1538 (7th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court has articulated
a similar standard for sufficiency-of-the-evidence review: whether an assessment at trial "could support any
rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-" United States v. Powell. 469 U S 57, 67 (1984)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Athanasios Basdekis. Book Note. Perfection by Nullification,
105 YALE L.J. 2285, 2290 (1996) (reviewing FINKEL, supra note 8) (noting that narrow focus of appellate
review renders this safeguard "grossly insufficient" to protect against nullification convictions)
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the "unidirectional nullification" proposals discussed above. Although Brody
seeks to defend nullification in general from the spectre of nullification
convictions, it is telling that he and other nullification proponents prefer
unidirectional instructions.2 3
Yet another difficulty plagues the argument that nullification can only
serve to help the hapless defendant: The law's goal cannot be merely that a
minimal number of persons be convicted of criminal offenses. Although there
is considerable disagreement about what the purpose of the criminal law
actually is, most would agree that it has at least something to do with
deterrence or punishment of those who commit socially undesirable acts.
Perhaps the importance of these goals can best be seen where the criminal law
serves to protect rights that we cherish just as deeply as criminal due process.
For example, federal civil rights law includes criminal provisions" aimed,
in part, at enforcing the guarantees of equal protection and due process of the
law embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Burke Marshall, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division
during the early 1960s, has called attention to some of the problems jury
nullification poses to enforcement of civil rights laws. l 5 "Jury nullification
has a tradition in America," writes Marshall, "but ... [i]ts main use in this
century probably has been to protect whites from the consequences of their
unlawful, often violent, racial oppression of blacks."' 26 None of this is to
say, of course, that all or even most acts of nullification would be of a similar
variety: Indeed, there might be times nullification would be used to reach
substantive ends of which we (individually or as a society) might approve.'
2 7
The point here is merely to recognize that granting juries a right to do "mercy"
places no substantive limitation on their idea of mercy, nor any substantive
guarantee that the policy outcomes will be socially desirable. Despite
nullificationists' arguments to the contrary, even mercy is a goal that our
criminal law system cannot afford to elevate bluntly to the fore.
Perhaps most fundamentally, authorized jury nullification simply cannot
act as a satisfying "check" on the discretion of institutional decisionmakers. As
the previous Section demonstrated, the jury fails to rival all but the most
hopelessly defective legislatures, for the jury as lawmaker, in any given case,
cannot be expected both to represent statistically the community and to do so
123. See Brody, supra note 8, at 121 (recommending instruction that would authorize nullification only
where "finding the defendant guilty is repugnant to your sense of justice"); Scheflin & Van Dyke, Mercfid
Juries, supra note 8, at 178 (criticizing proposed legislation on grounds that it would appear to authorize
not only nullification acquittals, but nullification convictions as well).
124. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
125. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 38; see also SEYMOUR WIsHMAN, ANATOMY OF A JURY 206
(1986) (describing discriminatory jury behavior in South after Civil War).
126. Marshall, supra note 7, at 38.
127. The minoritarian nature of jury decisionmaking, discussed earlier, casts some doubt on the
proposition that jury mercy would tend to be used in ways that society as a whole would consider desirable.
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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in a majoritarian manner. Although some would argue that nullification
provides a "check" against the sorts of discretion that police and prosecutors
exercise,"2 that hope seems misplaced. While we perhaps ought to be
troubled by the wide latitude that law enforcement officials'29 and
prosecutors'" enjoy in deciding whether or not to investigate or prosecute
particular criminal acts, the jury does not enjoy a particularly apt vantage point
from which to evaluate such acts of discretion. Because juries sit in isolated
cases, they do not have the opportunity to observe or review the pattern of
allocative decisions that has led to a particular defendant's being charged and
prosecuted. Moreover, because of the black box nature of the jury's
decisionmaking, we may never know what factors influenced its use of
discretion. A more promising remedy-at least where prosecutorial discretion
has resulted in an uneven pattern of enforcement against constitutionally
protected groups-is judicial supervision; judges cannot force more
prosecutions per se, but they can release those defendants who have been
prejudiced.'31  Other alternatives include measures to force police
nonenforcement decisions into the light of day 2 and to give prosecutors
financial incentives to exercise their discretion in a manner society desires.'33
C. Judging the Act of Authorization by Its Substance
Having seen the difficulties in the arguments advanced for the legitimacy
of the jury's role as lawmaker or as supplemental dispenser of mercy, we can
reevaluate the question with which we started: Can the political branches
legitimately delegate such authority to the jury? Moreover, we might wonder
whether the answer differs depending on which of the three types of authorized
nullification is chosen. The concerns we have seen thus far give rise to at least
three special concerns that inhere not merely in the substantive mechanics of
the delegated nullification power, but in the very legitimacy of the act whereby
lawmaking power is delegated to juries.
128. See, e.g., Dorfman & Iijima, supra note 8, at 900-02.
129. See Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process. Lo -Visbihty
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543. 552-54 (1960)
130. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F2d 167. 171 (5th Cit. 1965) ("The discretionary power of
the attorney for the United States in determining whether a prosecution shall be commenced or maintained
may well depend upon matters... wholly apart from any question of probable cause ")
131. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (ordenng convicts released from custody
after concluding that they had been prosecuted under racially selective enforcement scheme), see also
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) ("ITIlhe decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.' including the
exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights.") (quoung Oyler v Boles. 368 U S 448, 456
(1962)) (citation omitted).
132. See Goldstein, supra note 129, at 580-81, 588-89 (proposing "Policy Appratsal and Review
Board" which would, inter alia, review cases of alleged police harassment and generally publicize
information and policy recommendations).
133. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and
Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHANt L. RE%, 851 (1995)
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First, jury nullification would surely occur more frequently if jurors were
openly informed of their power to nullify. Irwin Horowitz's research provides
strong support for that intuition.134 Horowitz found that jury nullification
instructions produced an increased frequency of nullification behavior.3 5 No
empirical research has been done on the effect of reading to the jury the
particular language most common in current jury nullification proposals, which
I have termed "defendant-optional" plans. But perhaps the most salient feature
of defendant-optional plans, namely that defense attorneys, rather than judges,
would have the ability to inform jurors of the nullification power, turns out to
be less significant than it might appear. Horowitz's study compared
nullification behavior by jurors in one group, who were informed of the power
by the judge, with that of jurors in another group, who were informed by
attorneys. Somewhat surprisingly, he found that, at least with the cases
presented to the mock juries in his study, juries were even more likely to
nullify when informed by the lawyer than when informed by the judge.'36
To the extent that nullification injects indeterminacy more than democracy
into the law, explicitly authorized nullification does so more markedly.
Because nullification can either help or hurt an individual defendant, we can
expect nullification to result in increased penalization (or increased lenience)
based on legally irrelevant factors. It may be that "unidirectional nullification"
jury plans-which would carefully tell jurors that they have a right to acquit
a defendant notwithstanding the law, but a duty to acquit if they find
reasonable doubt-could obviate any added danger of nullification convictions.
However, this is only one type of harm that a defendant or potential defendant
might suffer. Although no empirical research has been done on the
unidirectional nullification instruction, to the extent that Horowitz's research
tends to suggest that jurors would follow instructions telling them they are
bound to follow the law, it seems likely that jurors would react to this
instruction as intended. Yet even the possibility of jury lenience makes the
potential defendant all the more unsure of what actions will, in fact, be held
to constitute crimes. As I will discuss more fully in the next Part, even the
unidirectional nullification proposal undermines the defendant-protective
concept of fair notice.
Second, when legislators grant juries a right to nullify, they distort the
shape of government. Legislatures, which have been delegated their powers by
the people as a whole, may certainly return some of that power to the people.
However, when legislatures grant that power not to the entire people (say, by
enacting a referendum process), but to a group of twelve randomly selected
citizens, they in effect create a rotating oligarchy. The jury's power is
134. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
135. See Horowitz, supra note 112, at 452.
136. See id. at 446.
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considerably more troubling than that of the conventional commission or
regulatory agency, for such jurors are given the power, on a case-by-case basis,
selectively to nullify constitutional provisions or repeal the statutory law
without open discussion. Commissions and agencies, by contrast, exercise their
rulemaking functions under close oversight and in the light of day.' The
jury invested with the power to nullify may choose to reject in stealth even
such constitutionally protected rights as the reasonable doubt standard. Because
the jury acts in secret, courts would have great difficulty ferreting out
discrimination or other unconstitutional lawmaking behavior.
Third, by explicitly delegating to juries a power to make law or even to
make exceptions to the law, legislators undermine their own ability to speak
clearly, credibly, and coherently. In so doing, they alienate the ability of the
people as well to speak and act through their legislature. Because, as we have
seen, the jury cannot be designed in such a way as both to represent the
community and to do so in a majoritarian manner, it is only a sour
substitute.1 38 Functionally, then, when a legislature invests juries with the
power to make law, it abdicates its own legislative function; formal legislation
becomes advisory. Citizens then would be foolhardy to petition their legislators
(except, perhaps, for repeal of the act conferring the nullification right), and
the statute books would serve as little more than a point of departure from
which law might or might not be drawn. If a legislature says that the law is
"X," but then explicitly gives jurors the power to say that it is "not-X," then
the initial statement of the law as "X" is little more than an illusion. The jury
might stand in the stead of the law, but the jury cannot function as a
democratic lawmaking institution.
III. JURY LAWMAKING AND THE CONSTITUTION
The deficiencies in the conferral of lawmaking authority upon juries fall
roughly into two categories: structural weakening of our democratic system of
government and potential prejudice to the criminal defendant. Although judicial
limiting constructions in Indiana and Maryland have saved the putative
nullification provisions in those states from constitutional invalidation, the
nullification proposals under consideration of late in state legislatures are not
amenable to such judicial narrowing.' In this Part, I argue that the two
categories of problems with authorized jury nullification translate into two
categories of constitutional infirmity. The problems for democratic legitimacy,
137. For more on the legal similarities and differences between jury and agency delegations. see infra
Subsection III.A.1.
138. Legislatures may be just as structurally flawed as the nullificationists argue However. it seems
unlikely that the best reform measure imaginable would combine nonrepresenativeness. minontanan
decisionmaking, and wildly unpredictable legal responses to commonly recurring phenomena.
139. See supra Section I.B.
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although Striking at the heart of constitutional norms, may evade judicial
remedy-at least at the federal level. By contrast, the effects of these proposals
on criminal defendants may be addressed by both federal and state courts, and
ought to be sufficient to invalidate these plans if they are in fact enacted.
A. Structural Impermissibility of Jury Delegation
Conferral of lawmaking powers upon juries has troubling implications for
the vitality of democratic self-governance. It would seem that such a conferral
would offend the Constitution, our instrument of self-government. Yet the
delegation of lawmaking authority is quite common. Congress often delegates
its authority to federal agencies by granting them broad powers. Not since
1935, at the height of anti-New Deal judicial activism, has the Supreme Court
used the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate such mandates. 40 This Section
argues that the Court's modem rationale for upholding legislative delegations
to administrative agencies does not insulate such jury delegations from
constitutional attack. Nonetheless, the political question doctrine of
justiciability would likely prohibit judicial review, at least at the federal level,
of this form of delegation. But that does not undermine the usefulness of the
analysis, for numerous state courts apply their own nondelegation doctrines,
many of which closely track the federal nondelegation jurisprudence. As a
result, even without federal court justiciability, the same nondelegation
principles may well be applied in state courts.14'
1. Can the Jury Be Analogized to the Agency?
Before moving to the tests used to evaluate the legitimacy of
administrative delegations, we must first confront the question of whether jury
delegations and administrative delegations share sufficient attributes to be
evaluated by the same standards. Administrative agencies today fulfill a broad
and varied swatch of duties. Although their factfinding t42  and
adjudicative'43 roles are subject to other forms of judicial scrutiny, the
140. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6,
at 71 (3d ed. 1994) (citing Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
141. For more on the nondelegation doctrine in the states, see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying
text. Because the states tend to track the federal standard, and because of the impracticality of attempting
to track the nuances of the standard as applied in each of the 50 states, the remainder of the discussion will
focus on the application of federal, rather than state, nondelegation principles.
142. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-65 (1932) (setting forth doctrine that Article III judges
should have power to review de novo facts found by administrative agencies, where those facts are
necessary to decide jurisdictional or constitutional issues); see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 82 & n.34 (1982) (quoting Crowell with approval and noting that
while Crowell's precise holding had been eroded, "general principle of Crowell . . . remains valid").
143. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1994) (providing for judicial review of certain agency actions).
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nondelegation doctrine polices their policymaking or quasi-legislative role.
Like the administrative agency in such a role, the jury under enacted
nullification is given a broad mandate to fashion the law. There are important
differences, of course, in function: Agencies are generally required to hold
hearings publicly, and their quasi-legislative work is collected into regulations,
which closely resemble statutory codifications. By contrast,juries invested with
nullification power (like juries generally) would meet behind closed doors and
would merely present a verdict in a given case, rather than a rule or standard
that would be applied to future cases. Still, the functions of these two bodies
run parallel in at least one crucial respect: Both are granted broad discretion
by the legislature to fashion norms that will have binding legal effect.
Still, it might be objected that jury delegations only grant juries the power
to "interpret" the law, or, alternatively, to "veto" a given application. The first
of these objections, based on an understanding of delegated jury nullification
as an act of interpretation, resonates to some degree with the limited function
remaining in Maryland.1" But none of the current proposals limits the jury's
prerogative to mere interpretation of the law. Instead, each gives the jury the
power to act within its own normative framework, quite apart from that
contained in statutory law.
The second of these objections, labeling the delegated nullification as a
"veto" power, might at first appear to remove jury delegations from scrutiny
under the nondelegation doctrine. However, even cast as a "veto" power, the
nondelegation analysis is still relevant. The analogy to a veto may most clearly
be seen in the "unidirectional nullification" proposal discussed above, wherein
juries are only allowed to nullify in the defendant's favor, effectively
determining that a law will not be applied in a given case. This power tracks
a sort of "veto" that only makes exceptions to the laws as passed by the
legislature and signed by the executive. However, in INS v. Chadha, "5 the
Supreme Court struck down just such a "veto" scheme whereby the veto could
be exercised by either House of Congress (even though the legislative veto
legislation had itself been approved through bicameralism and
presentment)." 6 Although this result strongly suggests that delegated
vetoes-if understood to be legislative or quasi-legislative in character-would
similarly be struck down under Chadha, the question of compatibility with the
nondelegation doctrine would persist.4 7 Because the source of the enacted
144. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
145. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
146. See id. at 942 n.13.
147. It may be that the jury "veto" would pass constutional muster under Chadlia At least one
dissenter believed that the majority's holding only limited vetoes exercised by one or both Houses of
Congress-but not those granted by Congress to executive or legislative agencies. See td at 989 (White.
J., dissenting). However, as the majority recognized, even where such authorized vetoes do not
impermissibly effect legislative vetoes, they must still be evaluated under the nondelegation doctrine See
id. at 953 n.16.
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nullification power is the political act of delegation, review under the
nondelegation doctrine cannot thereby be avoided. Thus, after brief
examination of the region of overlap shared by jury and administrative
delegations, it seems appropriate to analyze enacted jury nullification under the
nondelegation doctrine.
2. Can Jury Delegations Survive Scrutiny?
While agency delegations are not invalid per se, overly broad conferrals
of the legislative power are considered to be invalid under the nondelegation
doctrine. The use so far of the term "delegation" to refer to authorized jury
nullification (and to authorized agency lawmaking) is not meant to be
conclusory; the question remains whether such delegations are sufficiently
broad to be invalid under the nondelegation doctrine.
Essentially two lines of reasoning have been used to uphold legislative
delegations to other parts of the government. First, many delegations are made
to government entities that are politically accountable. For example, the
Supreme Court has upheld delegation to the Attorney General of the power to
determine, for purposes of criminal law, that a drug is "dangerous," and
therefore that possessing or selling it is a crime.'48
Second, even if the entities making the decision are not politically
accountable, so long as Congress clearly defines standards to guide them in
their decisionmaking, the delegation is permissible. On the basis of this
principle, the Court has upheld the delegation of authority by Congress to the
United States Sentencing Commission.'49 The Commission was to be made
up of at least three federal judges and four other members appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. 5 ' Despite the fact that federal
judges, by virtue of life tenure, and the other members, by virtue of statutory
provision, 151 were insulated from political accountability, the Court reasoned
that Congress's articulation of "intelligible principle[s]" limited and guided the
Commission's discretion.
52
Grants of jury discretion by legislatures, however, cannot be justified by
either of these rationales. Juries, by their nature, are not politically accountable.
Unlike the Environmental Protection Agency, which the Court has held to be
148. See Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (upholding delegation of authority to Attorney
General to add new drugs to schedule of banned drugs); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865--66 (1984) (upholding delegation to EPA of power to define
regulations, on ground that executive agencies are politically accountable through President).
149. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
150. See id. at 368. Additionally, no more than four Commissioners could be drawn from the same
political party. See id.
151. See id. (noting that Commission members could be removed by President "'only for neglect of
duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown') (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1989)).
152. Id. at 379. The "intelligible principle" test is drawn from J.W. Hampton, Jr & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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accountable through the Chief Executive's own political accountability,' the
jury can suffer no formal reprisals for its decision-a proposition established
in the English Court of Common Pleas's 1670 decision in Bushell's Case,""
which set the lasting principle that jurors could not be punished for rendering
nullification verdicts.' 55 The delegation of jury lawmaking through
nullification is the very antithesis of laying down "intelligible principles." Such
delegations are unintelligible and incoherent because they allow legislatures to
legislate in apparent self-contradiction-for instance, to pass criminal laws that
are important to a small but vocal group, and yet to authorize juries to nullify
these laws and all others. However attractive this might be to some legislators,
it does violence to the ability of our society to see effective public policy made
by accountable bodies and to our ability to know what the law is.
Nonetheless, two important doctrinal barriers might appear to stand in the
way of judicial redress of these wrongs. First, as noted above, the Supreme
Court has not invalidated a statute on the basis of the nondelegation doctrine
since 1935, despite ever-expanding powers granted to administrative agencies.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently remarked that, "[i]n recent years, our
application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited ... to
giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be
thought to be unconstitutional."' 56 But this statement may contain an
important reason to think that the nondelegation doctrine would be applicable
to jury delegations: As discussed above, the current proposals for delegated
jury nullification-unlike their predecessors in Georgia, Indiana, and
Maryland-have been written to avoid judicial narrowing constructions. Faced
with the inability to cure constitutional deficiencies, courts might well consider
the renewed use of the nondelegation doctrine in this context.
Second, all the current proposals to enact jury nullification have been made
at the state level, where the U.S. Constitution may provide no basis for setting
aside improper delegations of state authority. The cases of congressional
delegation of legislative authority discussed above all turned on the
Constitution's explicit plan for separation of powers among the branches of
federal government. In particular, the text explicitly commits legislative
functions to Congress: "All legislative Powers ... shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States.' 57 By contrast, the only provision arguably
relevant to improper state delegations of power is the Guarantee Clause."'
However, the Supreme Court has long held that this Clause is nonjusticiable
153. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
154. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
155. For more on this principle, see supra note 3 and accompanying text; and infra Pan IV
156. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
158. Id. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government .... ").
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under the political question doctrine, and that Congress, rather than the
judiciary, has the authority to enforce it. 159 Some scholars advocate revisiting
the nonjusticiability of the Guarantee Clause,' and arguably the Supreme
Court has given some hint that it might be willing to do so. 6 ' Unless the
Court makes a sharp break with precedent, however, this Clause will not
facilitate efforts to get a judicial determination-at the federal level-that
delegations of the jury nullification power are unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, the Guarantee Clause may suggest two other avenues that
might be used to invalidate delegated jury nullification. First, it would be
possible for citizens to seek congressional redress, since federal courts have
held the Guarantee Clause to be nonjusticiable precisely because its
enforcement is committed to Congress. Here, the Guarantee Clause would
function to resolve any concerns that would arise from Congress's
encroachment on federalism in banning jury delegations. Second, recent work
(joined by a number of state court cases) suggests that the Guarantee Clause
might be justiciable in state courts, even if not in federal courts.'62 Indeed,
some states have a rich nondelegation doctrine, parallel in many ways to that
which has arisen in the federal courts under separation of powers notions
rooted in the United States Constitution. 63 It is at least conceivable that state
courts could provide an attractive forum for challenging the undemocratic
aspects of jury nullification.
B. The Defendant's Rights: Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses
Another vehicle for invalidation of explicitly delegated jury nullification
emanates not from the harm to voters or to the democratic system itself, but
from the harm caused to criminal defendants. Convicted defendants in
Maryland and Indiana have raised constitutional challenges to convictions
handed down by juries instructed that they were to "judge" or "determine" the
law.' 4 Their efforts have been rebuffed, however, due to judicial limiting
constructions and narrowed jury instructions that have left jurors with a
159. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937); Pacific States Tel.
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133, 142-51 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-45 (1849).
160. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO.
L. REv. 849 (1994).
161. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (noting that controversy existed over
justiciability of Guarantee Clause, but declining to address merits of this issue).
162. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
709 (1994) (discussing state court justiciability of Guarantee Clause in context of initiatives); see also In
re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d 772, 779-81 (Okla. 1992) (noting state court justiciability of
Guarantee Clause, and proceeding to analyze merits of Guarantee Clause claim at issue).
163. See, e.g., Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of Delegation Doctrine in the States,
8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567,567 (1994) ("In many respects .... the delegation doctrine in the states reflects
the history of the delegation doctrine in the federal government.").




substantially reduced lawmaking province. Under recent proposals for
delegated jury nullification, those convicted would have valid claims of error.
The two constitutional provisions most clearly implicated by these
proposals are the guarantee of "due process"'65 and the prohibition on
"Bill[s] of Attainder" and "ex post facto Law[s].""IM If, as I have argued, the
act of legislatively recognizing the nullification power amounts to a delegation
of lawmaking authority, then the jury is effectively being granted the power
to criminalize an action after the fact and for a particular defendant. That is
true precisely because all of the jury's work takes place after the allegedly
criminal episodes transpired and with only one or a handful of individual
defendants before them. Thus, a conviction by such a jury could very well take
the form of both an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder. Because we
would never be able to know whether the jury accepted the invitation to
fashion its own law for the case, a court would properly presume prejudice and
overturn a conviction made by a jury with such a mandate.
In addition to these constitutional infirmities, citizens would be faced with
an inability to predict what will and will not be considered criminal behavior.
Such a process would violate the notice component of the due process
guarantee.' 67 Of course, the jury would only be given the opportunity to
render a verdict on a particular criminal offense if there were sufficient
evidence of legal guilt for the judge to send the jury into deliberations, rather
than merely granting a motion for acquittal. But as demonstrated above, it
would still be possible for jurors to determine among themselves that the
defendant is legally not guilty and yet, by nullifying, return a guilty verdict.
Notice to the citizen-ever the potential defendant-would be minimal: She
will need to avoid not only taking those actions that are culpable, but also
doing all those things that would suggest culpability sufficient for a judge to
allow the jury to decide. Although such an effect might appear de minimis, in
fact, it could have a substantial chilling effect even on nonculpable activities:
A citizen fearful that she might some day have her case sent before a jury will
need to avoid activities that, though legal, would prejudice a jury against her.
Both the ex post facto/bill of attainder and vagueness problems clearly
inhere in the "blanket nullification" proposal. They also exist, though
somewhat less obviously, in the "defendant-optional" and "unidirectional
nullification" proposals. In the defendant-optional proposal, the defendant has
the option of informing the jury (through counsel) of its power to nullify. At
first blush, the defendant's decision to so inform the jury might be seen as a
waiver of any constitutional rights thus forgone. However, it seems plausible
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
166. Id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
167. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U S 156. 162 (1972) (sinking down vague
city ordinance, both because it failed to provide adequate notice and because it encouraged arbitrary and
discriminatory arrests and convictions).
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that the defendant would still have two arguments that would potentially allow
her to overcome the waiver barrier. First, she could argue that the harm was
not necessarily caused by her counsel's informing the jurors; whether or not
her attorney had done so, there would be a substantial likelihood that the jurors
would know that such arguments were permissible in the state and thus would
have assumed that they had such a power. Indeed, jurors might even see failure
to make such an argument as an unseemly strategic maneuver. Second, she
could argue that the harm done-in terms of vagueness-occurred before the
jurors were given instructions or even empaneled. The harm came in the form
of giving the defendant insufficient legal notice of the culpability of her
actions, and thus had nothing to do with the decision of whether or not to
inform the jurors of their power to nullify. This argument underscores the
danger (and incoherence) of making positive, statutory law while
simultaneously giving jurors a power to nullify it.
The latter argument might be made even by the defendant in a jurisdiction
that utilizes unidirectional nullification instructions. Even though the jury
would be given the option only of departing from the statutory law in the
defendant's favor, the defendant may argue that she suffered a harm in the
form of vague notice well before trial. When the legislature states that juries
shall have the power to grant exceptions to the application of any criminal law,
the legislature has functionally written an open-ended and fuzzy exception into
the statute books that are supposed to provide all citizens with effective notice;
such a jury is given a wide (though not unbounded) field of discretion in
which to formulate the law.'68 While jury "mercy" might sound like a
laudable goal, when it is enacted, it disturbs the baseline of criminality that
allows for meaningful notice.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE JURY?
This Note has argued that legislative attempts to authorize criminal juries
to nullify the law conflict with democratic and constitutional norms. While
proponents of such plans often seek to use such authorized nullification to
inject direct democratic lawmaking into the criminal trial, the jury model of
lawmaking fails to meet basic criteria for democratic lawmaking: It cannot at
once represent the community and do so in a majoritarian manner. Nor can the
jury place a satisfying "check" on institutional actors, for the jury (in addition
to lacking democratic credentials) does not see enough cases to measure truly
the allocative decisions made by discretionary institutional actors.
To some extent, as we have seen, these democratic deficiencies of
authorized jury nullification translate into constitutional violations that might
168. Cf. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that to tell juror
of nullification right is to inform juror that "it is he who fashions the rule that condemns").
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be reversed in proper cases. And under all such legislation recently proposed,
judges would likely be forced to face such constitutional issues head-on:
Unlike putative nullification provisions contained in the constitutions of
Georgia, Indiana, and Maryland, all recent proposals appear to be insulated
from significant judicial narrowing constructions.
The policy implications are clear: Legislators and citizens should work to
oppose the passage of such legislation. Particularly troubling are the "blanket
nullification" and "defendant-optional nullification" proposals discussed above.
"Unidirectional nullification" plans go further to circumscribe the jury's
discretion, but they do undermine the ability of the positive law to enforce
civil rights and to give notice.
While this Note has focused on proposals to authorize jury nullification,
it might be thought to have bearing as well on unauthorized nullification. For
if there can be no right to nullify, why pull any punches in combating the
power? In particular, we might wonder whether jurors should lose the
protection against punishment that they have enjoyed since Bushell's Case. 69
The answer, at least in part, may be that jurors do have an important
lawmaking role: Indeed jurors-but not juries-must make law. Whereas juries
are charged with finding the facts and applying them to the law, jurors, as
citizens in a democratic polity, have a responsibility to work through
democratic channels to reform laws that violate their consciences. As
Tocqueville aptly noted, jury service "may be regarded as a gratuitous public
school, ever open, in which every juror learns his rights ... and becomes
practically acquainted with the laws.' 170 The principle of Bushell's Case, that
jurors may not be held legally accountable for the verdicts they render, protects
jurors from the chilling effects of sanctions on them. Already burdensome
financially and socially, jury service would become something citizens would
avoid with vigor if jurors could be punished for their verdicts.
What can and must be done, however, is to impress upon jurors their duty
to follow the law. In another forum, jurors as citizens may question and seek
to change the law. As the very word "verdict" suggests, the jury's duty is to
tell the truth.17' Telling the truth may require juries to do the unpopular, but
it must never mean that they ignore their mandate under the law. By contrast,
when these twelve people-good, true, even angry--emerge from the jury
room and blend once again with the rest of the body politic, they may be able
to share with their fellow citizens the lessons they have learned.
169. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670); see supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing role this
principle plays in facilitating jury nullification).
170. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, DEIOCRACY IN AMERICA 285 (Vintage ed 1945) (1835)
Tocqueville goes on to write: "I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who have lawsuits, but
I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who judge them-" Id.
171. The word "verdict" derives from a combination of the Latin roots for "truth" and -speak" See
19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTrONARY 532 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds.. 2d ed 1989)
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